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Abstract: Cryptocurrencies allow users to securely
transfer money without relying on a trusted interme-
diary, and the transparency of their underlying ledgers
also enables public verifiability. This openness, how-
ever, comes at a cost to privacy, as even though the
pseudonyms users go by are not linked to their real-
world identities, all movement of money among these
pseudonyms is traceable. In this paper, we present
Möbius, an Ethereum-based tumbler or mixing service.
Möbius achieves strong notions of anonymity, as even
malicious senders cannot identify which pseudonyms be-
long to the recipients to whom they sent money, and is
able to resist denial-of-service attacks. It also achieves
a much lower off-chain communication complexity than
all existing tumblers, with senders and recipients need-
ing to send only two initial messages in order to engage
in an arbitrary number of transactions.
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1 Introduction
When Bitcoin was initially deployed in 2009, it was her-
alded as an anonymous digital form of cash, as there
are no credentials required to transfer funds (just as
one does not need a bank account to use cash), and the
pseudonyms that users go by within the system are not
linked in any way to their real-world identities.
Despite these initial perceptions, it has now become
clear that Bitcoin and other similarly structured cryp-
tocurrencies are not anonymous, as the transparency of
their transaction ledgers means that it is not only pos-
sible to track flows of bitcoins as they pass from one
pseudonym to another, but also to cluster pseudonyms
together and understand when funds are meaningfully
changing hands [1, 23, 24, 26–29, 31, 33]. In addition
to this long line of research, there are also now compa-
nies (e.g., Chainalysis and Coinalytics) devoted solely
to tracking bitcoins—and other cryptocurrencies that
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have the same structure— in order to perform risk scor-
ing and aid law enforcement investigations.
Despite the arguable advantages of being able to
track flows of funds, it is not desirable for anyone with
access to the ledger to be able to do it at a wide scale,
targeting both honest and dishonest users. For exam-
ple, thieves could use clustering techniques to identify
lucrative targets, and companies that pay their employ-
ees in bitcoin could use tracking techniques to spy on
their spending habits. It is therefore just as important
for honest users to be able to protect their privacy as it
is for law enforcement to be able to track the activity
of dishonest users.
Until a few years ago, the main option available
to users who wished to improve upon the level of
anonymity already present in Bitcoin was to use a tum-
bler (also known as a mixing service); i.e., a centralized
service that would “clean” bitcoins: if you sent them
your bitcoins then they would send you back bitcoins
from another user, thus severing the link between the
sender and recipient in the transaction. Due to their
nature, however, such services are able to steal the bit-
coins sent to them [24], and are furthermore reliant on
having a high number of customers with roughly sim-
ilar amounts they wish to transact in order to mean-
ingfully prevent someone from linking the inputs and
outputs [11, 28].
In response to this, the past few years have seen a
large rise in the numbers of privacy-enhancing systems
available for cryptocurrencies, whether it is Bitcoin-
based centralized mixing services that cryptographi-
cally prevent the tumbler from stealing from its cus-
tomers [7, 16, 34], Bitcoin-based “privacy overlays”
that are effectively decentralized mixing protocols, in
which users swap bitcoins themselves [21, 32], privacy-
enhancing solutions for other cryptocurrencies [19], or
entire standalone cryptocurrencies that are specifically
designed to improve anonymity [3, 35].
Despite the broad availability of a wide variety of
mixing services, most of them still suffer from some
drawbacks; e.g., most decentralized mixing services re-
quire a high degree of coordination and allow every
sender to learn the links between senders and recipients.
In centralized mixing services, in the best case the tum-
bler is trusted for availability, as there is always a period
of time where the user wishing to mix their coins has
performed the transaction sending them to the mixer,
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but the tumbler has not yet sent them to the recipi-
ent. If the tumbler goes oﬄine during this period, the
sender will have lost control of their coins indefinitely.
Finally, standalone cryptocurrencies must gain a signif-
icant following in order to have any value, and are not
modular in the sense that if a flaw is found in the under-
lying protocol [26], its developers must update it using
a cumbersome forking process.
Our contributions.
To address the above limitations, we present Möbius,
which achieves strong anonymity guarantees with min-
imal off-chain communication overhead and a minimal
number of on-chain transactions. To accompany it, we
also present (1) the first game-based security model for
a tumbler, which is general enough to be of indepen-
dent interest and allows us to cryptographically prove
our security properties, and (2) an implementation that
confirms that Möbius is efficient enough to be used in
practice, with relatively cheap costs in terms of both
computing transactions, and deploying and using the
contract. In particular, the fact that participants in
Möbius can perform an arbitrary number of transfers
after the initial—and itself optional—exchange of just
two messages means that they can use it in a purely
non-interactive fashion (i.e., a sender can transfer value
to a recipient without needing their permission or other
type of engagement), just as they would use Bitcoin or
any other standalone cryptocurrency.
Intuitively, Möbius replaces a centralized mixing
service with an Ethereum smart contract that does the
mixing autonomously; this allows it to resist availablity
attacks, but without the high coordination costs or lack
of modularity imposed by, respectively, decentralized so-
lutions and standalone cryptocurrencies. After present-
ing Ethereum and the two cryptographic primitives we
rely on, stealth addresses and ring signatures, in Sec-
tion 2, we go on in Section 3 to outline our threat model
and the cryptographic properties we want to achieve.
We then present our construction of Möbius in Sec-
tion 4 and evaluate both the abstract protocol design
(in Section 5) and our prototype implementation (in
Section 6). We then provide thorough comparisons with
related work in Section 7. We finish by discussing sev-
eral possible extensions and improvements to Möbius in
Section 8, and concluding in Section 9.
2 Building Blocks
In this section, we describe the building blocks we
need for Möbius: the Ethereum blockchain (Section 2.2),
stealth addresses (Section 2.3), and linkable ring signa-
tures (Section 2.4). In addition to providing the relevant
background for each building block, we also provide for-
mal definitions for both their input-output behavior and
their security.
2.1 Preliminaries
If x is a binary string then |x| denotes its bit length. If S
is a finite set then |S| denotes its size and x $←− S denotes
sampling a member uniformly from S and assigning it to
x. λ ∈ N denotes the security parameter and 1λ denotes
its unary representation. ε denotes the empty string.
For a tuple t = (x1, . . . , xn) we denote as t[xi] the value
stored at xi.
Algorithms are randomized unless explicitly noted
otherwise. PT stands for polynomial-time. By y ←
A(x1, . . . , xn; r) we denote running algorithm A on in-
puts x1, . . . , xn and random coins r and assigning its
output to y. By y $←− A(x1, . . . , xn) we denote y ←
A(x1, . . . , xn; r) for coins r sampled uniformly at ran-
dom. By [A(x1, . . . , xn)] we denote the set of values that
have positive probability of being output by A on inputs
x1, . . . , xn. Adversaries are modeled as algorithms.
We use games in definitions and proofs of security.
A game G has a main procedure whose output is the
output of the game. Pr[G] denotes the probability that
this output is 1.
Central to all of our building blocks is the idea of a
digital signature, which consists of three algorithms: via
(pk, sk) $←− DS.KeyGen(1λ) one generates a public and se-
cret key; via σ $←− DS.Sign(sk,m) one uses the secret key
to sign the messagem; and via 0/1← DS.Verify(pk,m, σ)
one verifies whether or not σ represents a signature on
the message m under the secret key associated with pk.
For ease of exposition, we assume that either sk con-
tains pk or that pk can be efficiently computed given
sk. Due to its usage in most cryptocurrencies, we use
ECDSA throughout, so the key generation algorithm
for all our other primitives is the same as DS.KeyGen;
we thus use the unified term KeyGen to refer to all of
them. KeyGen generally takes as input a group G of some
prime-order q (where q is a λ-bit prime), but in what
follows we treat this group as fixed given λ and refer to
KeyGen(1λ) rather than KeyGen(G).
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2.2 Cryptocurrencies
The first cryptocurrency to be deployed was Bitcoin,
which was introduced on January 3 2009. In Bitcoin, the
ledger of transactions is stored in a blockchain, which
is a chain of blocks where each block contains a list
of transactions. In terms of the structure of Bitcoin
transactions, users are identified by addresses (which
are themselves hashes of public keys), and transactions
essentially serve to transfer not bitcoins themselves, but
the right to spend a certain amount of bitcoins from
one party to another. This right is defined as belong-
ing to list of unspent transaction outputs (or UTXOs
for short), which specifies—as the name suggests— the
transaction outputs that have not yet been used as in-
put. A transaction can thus be thought of as a list of
input addresses and output addresses, along with the
value that should be sent to each output address. When
a transaction is accepted into the ledger, the rights to
spend the associated bitcoins transfer from the input
addresses to the output addresses.
In contrast to this relatively simple transaction
structure, which supports only atomic transfers of funds
from one set of parties to another, the Ethereum
blockchain acts as an (almost) Turing-complete dis-
tributed virtual machine (often referred to as the
Ethereum Virtual Machine, or EVM), along with a
built-in currency called ether. The increased function-
ality in Ethereum enables developers to create smart
contracts on the blockchain, which are stateful programs
that run autonomously. The only limitation on the func-
tionality of smart contracts is their complexity: every
operation they perform consumes a certain amount of
gas, which is a subcurrency within Ethereum designed
to limit the amount of computation that an individual
contract can use.
Ethereum addresses take one of two forms: “exter-
nally owned” addresses, which behave like Bitcoin ad-
dresses and are similarly controlled by a secret key, or
contract addresses, which store the immutable code of
the smart contract. Contract addresses are also asso-
ciated with some additional storage, which is used to
store the state of the smart contract.
Ethereum transactions contain a destination ad-
dress to, a signature σ authorizing the transaction (cor-
responding to a sender with keypair (pk, sk)), a gas limit
(which, for ease of exposition, we ignore in our formal
specifications below), an amount amt in ether, and an
optional data field data. If the destination address is ex-
ternally owned, then the transfer goes through just as it
would in Bitcoin. If the destination address corresponds
to a contract, then the contract code is executed (sub-
ject to the specified gas limit) on any inputs specified in
the data field, which may result in updating the state of
the contract and/or triggering additional transactions
(subject to the gas limit, which in turn is restricted by
the maximum gas limit per block).
Formally, with H a hash function, we define
the cryptographic aspects of the formation and ver-
ification of generic blockchain transactions as fol-
lows: via tx $←− FormTx(sk, to, amt, data) one cre-
ates a transaction, which involves creating h ←
H(to, amt, data) and σ $←− DS.Sign(sk, h) and returning
(pk, σ, h, to, amt, data); and via 0/1 ← VerifyTx(tx) one
verifies the signature in a transaction, which means re-
turning DS.Verify(tx[pk], tx[h], tx[σ]).
2.3 Stealth addresses
In cryptocurrencies, stealth addresses (respectively,
stealth keys) refer to addresses (respectively, keys) that
have been derived from a master key, but that—with-
out the value used to perform the derivation—cannot
be linked to other addresses derived from the same key.
The addresses generated by hierarchical deterministic
(HD) wallets can be viewed as a form of stealth ad-
dress [15], and as such these addresses are widely used
in Bitcoin (and other cryptocurrencies) today.
In addition to the unified key generation al-
gorithm KeyGen, we define the two algorithms
associated with stealth addresses as follows: via
spk ← SA.PubDerive (mpk, secret, nonce) one can de-
rive from a master public key and a shared se-
cret and nonce a stealth public key; and via ssk ←
SA.PrivDerive (msk, secret, nonce) one can derive from a
master secret key and a shared secret and nonce a
stealth secret key.
Stealth keys then have the property that all keys
derived from a valid master keypair are themselves a
valid keypair; i.e., that for all secret, nonce ∈ {0, 1}∗
and (mpk,msk) ∈ [KeyGen(1λ)], (SA.PubDerive(mpk,
secret, nonce),SA.PrivDerive(msk, secret, nonce)) ∈
[KeyGen(1λ)]. In particular then, if two users Alice
and Bob share a secret and a nonce, and Alice knows
Bob’s master public key, then by incrementing nonce
Alice can create many transactions sending coins to
many different stealth addresses, rather than to the
same address every time.
For this to be meaningful, we need not only a notion
of correctness, but also a notion of security; i.e., we want
to ensure that stealth addresses cannot be linked by
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anyone who doesn’t know the shared secret, even if they
know both the master public key and the nonce. For
that, we define a notion of stealthiness (which is really
a form of re-randomizability) as follows:
Definition 2.1 (Stealthiness). (KeyGen,SA.PubDerive,
SA.PrivDerive) is stealthy if the distributions
over derived keys and over randomly generated
keys are equal; i.e., if for all secret, nonce ∈
{0, 1}∗ and (mpk,msk) ∈ [KeyGen(1λ)], {(pk, nonce,
mpk)
∣∣ pk ← SA.PubDerive(mpk, secret, nonce)} ={
(pk, nonce,mpk)
∣∣ (pk, sk) $←− KeyGen(1λ)}.
Bitcoin and Ethereum use ECDSA, which means
KeyGen produces keys of the form (gr, r), where g is
the generator of a group G of prime order q and r ∈ Fq.
As used in these cryptocurrencies, the additional algo-
rithms are then defined as follows:1
SA.PubDerive(mpk, secret, nonce)







In this construction, it is clear that if secret is ran-
dom and H(·) is modeled as a random oracle then spk
is also distributed uniformly at random, so the derived
keypair satisfies stealthiness. If we fix the length of the
nonce then we can also prevent against length-extension
attacks (although here these are prevented anyway due
to the assumption about random oracles).
2.4 Ring Signatures
In contrast to regular digital signatures, which ver-
ify against a specific public key, ring signatures verify
against a set, or ring, of public keys. This allows parties
to prove that they are part of a group without reveal-
ing exactly which public key belongs to them [30]. In
contrast to group signatures [2, 8, 9], in which users
1 In these algorithms we alter the input/output behavior
slightly by having them output the incremented nonce as well.
In what follows we use the version where they output just the
key, for ease of exposition, but assume the nonce is incremented
every time.
must register as members of the group and at any
point in time its membership list is well defined, the
ring used for ring signatures can be formed on an ad-
hoc basis, which is especially useful in an open envi-
ronment like a cryptocurrency. In addition to KeyGen,
ring signatures involve the following two algorithms: via
σ
$←− RS.Sign(sk,R,m) one can use sk to sign m as a
member of R; and via 0/1← RS.Verify (R,m, σ) one can
verify if a signature σ on a message m really came from
a member of R.
In a regular ring signature, signatures reveal only
that the signer is part of the ring, and nothing else.
In a linkable ring signature scheme [20] (which is itself
related to a unique ring signature [12, 13]), signatures
instead reveal whether or not the signer has already pro-
duced a signature for that ring, although they still do
not reveal their identity. This means that they require
an extra algorithm as follows: via 0/1← RS.Link (σ1, σ2)
one can tell whether or not two signatures were pro-
duced by the same signer.
Informally, the security properties of a linkable ring
signature are as follows:
Anonymity: Modulo the ability to run RS.Link, an ad-
versary cannot identify which ring signature corre-
sponds to which of the public keys in the ring;
Unforgeability: An adversary cannot produce a valid
signature if it does not know a secret key correspond-
ing to a public key included in the ring;
Exculpability: An adversary cannot produce a valid
signature that links to the signature of another mem-
ber of the ring, whose key the adversary does not
control; and
Linkability: Any two signatures produced by the same
signer within the same ring are publicly linkable (i.e.,
anyone can detect that they were produced by the
same signer).
As we see in our construction in Section 4, link-
able ring signatures allow us to construct a tumbler in
which recipients remain anonymous but we can still en-
sure they only withdraw the funds to which they are
entitled; i.e., they cannot withdraw funds twice by pro-
ducing two ring signatures.
Concretely, we use a minimally adapted version of a
linkable ring signature due to Franklin and Zhang [13]
(FZ), whose security is implied by the Decisional
Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption in the random oracle
model. FZ signatures were chosen due to their compati-
bility with ECDSA, their efficient verification, and their
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reliance on a weak and well established assumption (in
addition to the random oracle model, which we already
assume anyway).
We modify slightly the role of the message within
FZ signatures. As originally presented, FZ ring signa-
tures can be linked only if they are produced by the
same party over the same ring and message. To instead
achieve the case where they can be linked if they are
produced by the same party over the same ring (regard-
less of the message), we form the signature over the
message exactly as given in FZ, but without including
the message within the linking tag. In other words, the
linking tag used in our modified FZ signature is formed
as H(R)xi , rather than as H(m‖R)xi (where m is the
message, R is the ring, and xi is the secret key of the i-th
participant). This adapts the FZ signature from being
a unique ring signature to one satisfying the standard
definition of linkable ring signatures, without affecting
any other security properties.
Sublinear linkable ring signatures (i.e., linkable ring
signatures whose size is sublinear in the number of par-
ticipants in the ring) would yield asymptotically smaller
signatures, although it is not clear that they would nec-
essarily be more efficient for the relatively small number
of participants we expect in our setting. Moreover, all
existing sublinear ring signatures require not only an ac-
companying linking tag to become linkable, but also—
in order to maintain the same anonymity guarantees
in the broader context of a tumbler—a zero-knowledge
proof that the linking tag is correctly formed. Thus,
while there do exist sublinear ring signatures based on
the same security assumptions, such as the one by Groth
and Kohlweiss [14], we do not consider them fully suit-
able for this setting. We discuss this further when we
compare against existing solutions in Section 7.
3 Threat Model
This section describes the participants in the system
and their interactions, both with one another and with
the tumbler, and the goals we aim to achieve by using
Möbius. In addition to providing an informal explana-
tion of the setting, we also give formal algorithms and
definitions of security, which may be independently use-
ful in analyzing the security of other proposed tumblers.
3.1 Participants and interactions
Participants in Möbius can act as either senders or re-
cipients, with senders taking on the responsibility of
transferring funds to recipients via the tumbler. We of-
ten use Alice to refer to the sender, and Bob to refer to
the recipient.
One of the main goals of Möbius is to minimize the
off-chain communication required between the sender
and recipient. We therefore consider only two interac-
tions between them, one to initialize their interaction
and one for Alice to (optionally) notify Bob that his
funds are ready to be withdrawn. We also consider the
interactions that each of them has with the tumbler,
the checks that the tumbler performs, and the ways in
which the tumbler updates its own internal state. In all
the following interactions and algorithms, we assume the
public state of the tumbler is implicitly given as input.
Initialize: The sender and the recipient, each in pos-
session of their respective secret key skA and skB ,
(optionally) engage in this interaction to establish a
shared basis for future transactions, which we denote
aux ∈ {0, 1}∗.
tx $←− Deposit(skA, pkB , aux): The sender runs this algo-
rithm to deposit a specific amount of funds into the
tumbler.
0/1← VerifyDeposit(tx): The tumbler runs this algo-
rithm to check that the sender’s deposit is valid.
ProcessDeposit(tx): If the deposit is valid, the tumbler
runs this algorithm to update its internal state ac-
cordingly.
Notify: The sender runs this algorithm to generate a
notification that the funds are ready to be collected
from the contract, which she can then send (off-chain)
to the recipient.
tx $←−Withdraw(skB , aux): The recipient runs this algo-
rithm to withdraw his funds from the tumbler.
0/1← VerifyWithdraw(tx): The tumbler runs this algo-
rithm to check that the recipient’s withdrawal is
valid.
ProcessWithdraw(tx): If the withdrawal is valid, the
tumbler runs this algorithm to update its internal
state accordingly.
3.2 Security goals
We consider security in terms of three goals: anonymity,
availability, and theft prevention. The formal game-
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based specification of these goals can be found in the
full version of the paper [22].
3.2.1 Anonymity
We would like to ensure that sender and recipient ad-
dresses are anonymous; i.e., that for a given sender, it is
not possible to distinguish between their recipient and
any other recipient using the tumbler. We consider this
goal with respect to four types of attackers: (a) an eaves-
dropper who is acting as neither the sender nor the re-
cipient; (b) a malicious sender (or set of senders); (c)
a malicious recipient (or set of recipients); and (d) the
tumbler itself. As we will see in Section 5, most existing
solutions achieve anonymity with respect to (c) but not
(b), whereas Möbius achieves anonymity with respect
to (b) but not (c).
We define two variants of anonymity: sender
anonymity and recipient anonymity. In the former, we
allow an adversary to take over any actor in the sys-
tem, but require that they still cannot distinguish be-
tween the deposits of two honest senders. We assume
that deposits determine some identifier of the recipient,
however, as a sender must specify in some way to whom
they are sending money. We thus achieve this notion
only in the case that the recipient is the same across
the two senders. To define recipient anonymity with re-
spect to malicious senders, we again allow an adversary
to take over any actor in the system, but require that
the withdrawal transactions produced by any two re-
cipients (including ones that the adversary has placed
deposits for, but not ones that it controls) should be
indistinguishable.
3.2.2 Availability
We would like to prevent attacks on availability, mean-
ing that (a) no one can prevent the sender from using
the tumbler; and (b) once the money is in the tumbler,
no one can prevent the honest recipient from withdraw-
ing it. While the first property is not based on crypto-
graphic aspects of the system, the second property is
and thus we can model its security accordingly.
Formally, we consider an honest set of recipients
that would like to withdraw even in the face of an ad-
versary that can take on the role of any of the senders
or additional recipients, and we say the adversary wins
if they manage to get the tumbler into a state whereby
an honest recipient is involved but unable to withdraw
their funds.
3.2.3 Theft prevention
We would like to ensure that the scheme does not allow
coins to be either withdrawn twice (as this will steal
them from the last recipient who attempts to withdraw
from the contract), or withdrawn by anyone other than
the intended recipient.
4 Our Scheme: Möbius
4.1 Overview
Intuitively, Möbius replaces the central tumbler used in
previous schemes with a mixing Ethereum smart con-
tract, which allows it to run autonomously. This allows
the system to achieve a strong notion of availability,
and by combining stealth keys and ring signatures it
also achieves anonymity, theft prevention, and very low
communication overhead.
In shifting from a central tumbler to a smart con-
tract stored on a public blockchain, there are several
challenges we face. First, a central tumbler somewhat
inherently relies on its ability to store some secret infor-
mation that allows the tumbler, and only the tumbler,
to release the funds once the rightful recipient attempts
to claim them. In a public blockchain, this is impossi-
ble, as both the code of the smart contract and all its
storage are globally visible. Second, many cryptographic
operations (which are often needed in tumblers) require
a source of randomness. The Ethereum Virtual Machine
(EVM) is deterministic by its very nature: if it was not,
state changes from contracts executed on different ma-
chines might not be consistent, which would cause nodes
to fail to reach consensus. This means we cannot use any
randomness in the smart contract.
To overcome these challenges, we leave all secret-key
and randomized cryptographic operations to the sender
and recipient to perform locally. First, to establish the
ability to derive stealth keys, Alice and Bob share Bob’s
master public key, a secret, and a nonce. Every time she
wishes to send a certain amount of money to Bob, Alice
uses the shared secret to derive a fresh stealth public
key from the master key.
If Alice were to directly send the money to the cor-
responding stealth address, then even if Alice and Bob
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never used the addresses involved again, the transac-
tion would still create a link between them. Thus, to
sever this link, Alice instead sends the money and the
stealth key to a contract responsible for mixing this ex-
act amount of money. (This means that if Alice wants to
send an amount that is not covered by a single contract,
she must first split her money into the correct denomi-
nations, as is done— for example— in traditional cryp-
tographic e-cash. We discuss this further in Section 8.2.)
Once sufficiently many senders have paid into the
contract, the list of stealth public keys it stores is used
to form a ring. Bob can now reclaim his money in an
anonymous fashion by forming a signature that verifies
with respect to the ring in the contract. Here again, the
naïve solution is problematic: if Bob forms a normal (un-
linkable) ring signature, he could withdraw the funds of
other recipients in the contract in addition to his own.
If Bob withdraws to the same stealth address generated
by Alice, then—because Alice’s transaction reveals the
link between her address and his stealth address— this
would again trivially reveal the link between him and
Alice. To address these issues, Bob instead creates a
linkable ring signature to claim the funds (thus ensur-
ing he can only withdraw once), and a new ephemeral
address to receive the funds (thus ensuring that there is
no link between the address that Alice uses to send the
funds and the address at which he receives them).
It is important to acknowledge that the current ver-
sion of the EVM does not allow newly created addresses
without any value stored in them to send 0-ether trans-
actions (which is what Bob does to withdraw from the
contract). This will be changed in the next version of the
EVM, Metropolis, but in the meantime we discuss ways
to alter Möbius in order to maintain both trustlessness
and compatibility with the current EVM in Section 8.5.
4.2 Initializing the contract
The contract, held at address idcontract, is initialized by
specifying the amount in ether that it accepts and the
threshold of senders that it wants to have. This means
it is initialized with the following variables:
– participants: number of parties needed to form the
ring;
– amt: denomination of ether to be mixed;
– pubkeys[]: the public keys over which the ring is
formed;
– senders[]: the sender addresses; and
Deposit(skA,mpkB , secret, nonce)
spkB ← SA.PubDerive (mpkB , secret, nonce)
return FormTx(skA, idcontract, amt, spkB)
VerifyDeposit(tx)
if (tx[amt] 6= idcontract[amt]) return 0
if (spkB /∈ G)) return 0
return VerifyTx(tx)
ProcessDeposit(tx)
add addr(tx[pk]) to sendaddr[]
add tx[data] to pubkeys[]
Withdraw(mskB , secret, nonce)
R← idcontract[pubkeys]






sskB , R, pkephem
)
return FormTx(pkephem, skephem, idcontract, 0, σ)
VerifyWithdraw(tx)
R← idcontract[pubkeys]
if (RS.Verify(R, tx[pk], tx[data]) = 0) return 0
if (∃σ ∈ contract : RS.Link(σ, tx[data]) = 1) return 0
return VerifyTx(tx)
ProcessWithdraw(tx)
add tx[data] to sigs[]
tx′ $←− FormTx(idcontract, pkephem, amt, ε)
Fig. 1. The formal specification of the algorithms that make up
Möbius.
– sigs[]: the signatures seen thus far (used to check for
double withdrawal attempts).
In addition to the code required to add public keys,
addresses, and signatures to the appropriate lists, the
contract also contains code to verify deposit and with-
drawal transactions (see below). So as not to require
on-chain storage of all signatures used in all previous
transactions, the contract’s storage is deleted after the
last withdrawal takes place. (And as an optimization,
we do not store the entire signature; see Section 6 for
more information.)
4.3 Initializing Alice and Bob
In order for Alice to be able to send coins to Bob, she
must first be aware of his master public key mpkB . In
the presence of an on-chain public-key directory, or if
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she otherwise has prior knowledge of mpkB , they need
only share the secret secret and initialize nonce ← 0.
If such a directory does not exist, the Initialize interac-
tion must also serve to share their master public keys
mpkA and mpkB , from which the secret secret can then
be shared using elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)
key exchange (or any other mechanism that results
in a secret known only to Alice and Bob). This in-
teraction thus enables both Alice and Bob to output
aux = (secret, nonce).
4.4 Paying in to the contract
To pay in to the contract, Alice first derives a new
stealth public key for Bob. She then creates a trans-
action sent to the contract using amt as the value and
the stealth public key as the data. Formally, Deposit is
defined as in Figure 1 (where, as in what follows, we
treat idcontract and amt as hard-coded).
(As illustrated here, and discussed further in Sec-
tion 5, the use of stealth keys is largely a communication
optimization, although it does also enable auditability,
as we discuss in Section 8.3. If communication overhead
were not a concern, the system would work the same if,
instead of Alice deriving a new key for Bob in a non-
interactive fashion, Bob simply sent a fresh key to Alice
to use.)
Alice then broadcasts this transaction, which even-
tually reaches the contract. The contract now checks
that this is a valid transaction; i.e., that it is formed
correctly and contains the right amount for this con-
tract, and also that the stealth public key is valid (i.e.,
has an associated secret key that can be used to with-
draw from the contract). Formally, it runs VerifyDeposit,
as defined in Figure 1. If these checks pass, it adds the
relevant keys to the lists it maintains, as illustrated by
ProcessDeposit in Figure 1.
When the required number of participants have
joined, the smart contract broadcasts a notification,
which is processed by Alice. Alice can then run Notify
to tell Bob (off-chain) that the contract is ready and
sends him the contract address idcontract. Alternatively,
if the contracts are fixed and have been registered (or
Bob otherwise knows idcontract), then Bob can process
this notification himself and the extra message is not
needed.
If some predefined time limit passes and not enough
participants have joined the contract, there are two op-
tions we consider: either the contract uses sendaddr[]
to refund the senders who have joined (which damages
availability), or the contract goes through with the mix
with the current number of participants (which reduces
the size of the anonymity set). We leave it up to the
creator of the contract which of these (or any other)
solutions they want to implement.
4.5 Withdrawing from the contract
To withdraw from the contract, Bob fetches the ring
description pubkeys[] from the contract. He then derives
the stealth secret key associated with the stealth public
key used by Alice, which allows him to create a ring
signature to withdraw his funds from the contract and
into an ephemeral address. Formally,Withdraw is defined
as in Figure 1.
The contract checks that this is a valid transac-
tion; i.e., that it contains a valid signature for the ring
R defined by the contract, that it doesn’t link to any
signature previously used to withdraw from the con-
tract, and that it is correctly formed. Formally, it runs
VerifyWithdraw, which is defined as in Figure 1.
If these checks pass, then the smart contract stores
the signature in order to verify future withdrawals, and
creates a transaction sending amt to addr(pkephem). Once
all participants have withdrawn from the contract, it
deletes all stored values except participants and amt to
prepare itself for a new round of mixing.
Again, if some predefined time limit passes and one
or more participants have not withdrawn from the con-
tract, there are several options. First, one could simply
not define such a time limit, and give recipients an arbi-
trary amount of time to withdraw their funds. Second,
one could allow the creator or the contract to simply
set the state back to the default, and claim any excess.
Again, we leave this decision up to the creator of the
contract.
As we elaborate on in Section 5, it is essential that
addr(pkephem) is a freshly generated key. If the address
corresponding to the public key spkB is used, then an
eavesropping adversary could simply hash all of the pub-
lic keys deposited into the ring and see if any correspond
to the addresses into which the funds are withdrawn. Be-
cause Alice’s deposit transaction includes both her own
address addrA and spkB , this will cause the sender and
recipient addresses to be linked. It is important to ob-
serve, finally, that if a nonce is ever reused then stealth-
iness is lost.
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5 Security
To demonstrate that Möbius satisfies the security model
in Section 3, we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 5.1. If the stealth address is secure (i.e., sat-
isfies stealthiness) and the ring signature is secure (i.e.,
satisfies anonymity, linkability, unforgeability, and ex-
culpability) then Möbius, as defined in Section 4, satis-
fies anonymity, availability, and theft prevention.
To prove this theorem, we break it down into several
lemmas. To formally prove the cryptographic aspects,
we consider an adapted version of Möbius that does not
use the optimization of using stealth addresses (i.e., in-
stead has Bob send Alice a fresh key every time, as
discussed in Section 4.4), and assumes that the set of
possible recipient keys is fixed ahead of time. We con-
sider this adapted version for ease of analysis, but the
security of this adapted version in fact implies the secu-
rity of the original version. Outside of these definitions,
we discuss the security of the original version explicitly.
We discuss our assumptions about the Ethereum
network where relevant below, but briefly we assume
that attackers cannot perform denial-of-service attacks
on both individual users (in the form of an eclipse at-
tack [17]) or on the network as a whole.
We begin with anonymity. Here, we can show that
both sender and recipient anonymity hold with respect
to all malicious parties. In terms of joining the two no-
tions together, however, overall anonymity does not hold
with respect to malicious recipients, as the deposit re-
veals the link between addrA and spkB , and the recip-
ient’s own formation of his withdrawal transaction re-
veals the link between spkB and pkephem. A malicious
recipient can thus fully link their own sender and re-
cipient. This can be somewhat mitigated if senders use
ephemeral addresses to pay into the contract, although
of course even this ephemeral address may be linked
back to the address that was used to fund it.
Lemma 5.2. If the stealth address is stealthy (Def-
inition 2.1) and the ring signature is anonymous,
then Möbius satisfies recipient anonymity and (partial)
sender anonymity with respect to all malicious parties,
and overall anonymity with respect to malicious senders
and eavesdroppers.
Proof. A formal proof of recipient anonymity can be
found in the full version of the paper [22]. Briefly,
this proof relies on the anonymity of ring signatures
to ensure that withdrawal transactions do not reveal
any information about the recipient who formed them,
and thus cannot be used to link spkB to pkephem. This
property holds with respect to malicious eavesdrop-
pers, senders, and recipients (and trivially with respect
to the tumbler). This places the recipient within the
anonymity set of other participants in the contract, al-
though we discuss in Section 8.4 ways to increase the
size of the anonymity set via repeated use of contracts.
As for sender anonymity, it holds as long as the ad-
dress addrA used to pay into the contract is chosen uni-
formly at random, as deposits will be distributed identi-
cally across different senders. In practice, however, this
address must contain some money, which in turn must
have come from somewhere. We thus achieve this notion
subject to the ability of an adversary to track the flow
of money into this address, which depends on how it has
been used.
As for overall anonymity (i.e., unlinkability), this
is again something we cannot achieve with respect to
malicious recipients. With respect to malicious eaves-
droppers, we consider the original version of Möbius
(i.e., the version that uses stealth addresses), and ar-
gue that it achieves the same level of anonymity as a
non-optimized version of the system in which, rather
than have Alice derive a stealth public key, Bob simply
generates a fresh keypair and (out of band) sends the
corresponding public key to Alice. By stealthiness, the
distributions of these two versions are identical. As the
second game furthermore reveals no information about
the identity of the recipient, we achieve this stronger
notion of anonymity with respect to eavesdroppers.
If at least two senders are honest, then in fact
the same argument applies with respect to the other
senders: they will not be able to tell which sender is
paying which recipient. If instead an adversary fills in
all but one slots in a contract, then this aspect of sender
anonymity is trivially broken. We cannot definitively
prevent this from happening, but (as previous solutions
suggest) if both deposits and withdrawals require a fee
then we can disincentivize this behavior by making it
prohibitively expensive.
Finally, we mention that because the contract waits
until it receives a certain number of participants, and
because all public keys in the ring are one-time use, we
reduce our vulnerability to statistical analysis such as
intersection or timing attacks [10] as well.
Next, we show availability, which is broken down into
two parts: first, the requirement that no one can prevent
a sender from depositing into the contract, and second,
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the requirement that no one can prevent an honest re-
cipient from withdrawing their own money from the con-
tract. We cannot prove the first property cryptograph-
ically (due to its relationship to non-cryptographic as-
pects of the system), but nevertheless argue that it holds
under reasonable assumptions.
Lemma 5.3. If the ring signature satisfies exculpabil-
ity, Möbius satisfies availability.
Proof. Briefly, we consider attacks on the first property
as carried out by four classes of adversaries: (a) the tum-
bler, (b) other potential senders, (c) other potential re-
cipients, and (d) the creator of the mixing contract.
For (a), whereas attacks on availablity could triv-
ially be carried out in previous schemes using central
services, by the tumbler simply going oﬄine, in Möbius
the mixing contract executes autonomously so this can-
not happen.
For (b), if all but one parties on the network refuse
to use the contract indefinitely, then—according to the
choices we present in Section 4.4—either the one re-
maining sender will have their deposit refunded, or their
transaction will go through in a non-anonymous fashion.
In the latter case there is no damage to availability (al-
though it negates the point of using the contract), and
in the former case the sender has wasted the gas costs
associated with forming the transaction, but at least has
not wasted additional resources (like a fee, or significant
time spent in off-chain coordination), or revealed any in-
formation about either herself or her intended recipient.
For (c), other potential recipients have no control
over whether or not a deposit is placed, so cannot pre-
vent a sender from doing so.
For (d), once the creator has deployed the contract,
they cannot prevent transfers from going through, as the
contract executes autonomously. The only exception is
if the creator optionally adds the ability to invoke the
Ethereum suicide function, which would allow them to
kill the smart contract, but this is visible in the contract
so if it is included then users can at least make them-
selves aware of this risk. If they wish to go further, users
can choose to deploy their own version of the contract
without such a function.
A formal proof of the cryptographic aspect of the
second property is in the full version of the paper.
Briefly, we argue that an adversary can prevent an
honest recipient’s withdrawal transaction from verifying
only if it propagates the contract with another transac-
tion that includes a ring signature linking to the one of
the honest recipient. This violates exculpability.
Non-cryptographically, if all but one parties refuse
to withdraw from the contract, this does not affect any
recipient’s ability to withdraw, nor does it affect the
size of his anonymity set (which is fixed as the number
of participants in the contract). The only way to pre-
vent an honest recipient from withdrawing funds stored
in the contract would be to stop all transactions from
being accepted into the ledger (i.e., perform a denial-
of-service attack on the whole Ethereum network), or
perform a persistent man-in-the-middle attack on Bob
in order to intercept his withdrawal transactions before
they reach the network. We consider these attacks ex-
pensive enough that they are unlikely to happen.
Finally, we show theft prevention.
Lemma 5.4. If the ring signature satisfies linkability
and unforgeability, then Möbius satisfies theft preven-
tion.
A proof of this lemma can be found in the full
version of the paper. Briefly, if an adversary has not
corrupted any recipients but can nevertheless provide
a withdrawal transaction that verifies, there are three
possibilities: it came up with the transaction entirely
by itself, it derived the transaction from a withdrawal
transaction it witnessed an honest recipient perform, or
it intercepted the transaction before it was included in
a block (a “front-running” attack) and replaced the re-
cipient address with one of its own. We can argue that
the first and third cases violate unforgeability, and the
second case violates linkability.
Given our specific choices of stealth address and ring
signature (presented in Section 2) and putting every-
thing together, we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 5.5. If H(·) is a random oracle and DDH
holds in G then Möbius, as defined in Section 4, satisfies
anonymity, availability, and theft prevention.
6 Implementation
To ensure that Möbius is efficient enough to be used in
practice, we implemented the system, and in this section
provide various performance benchmarks for it, both in
terms of the time taken for off-chain computations and
the gas consumed in on-chain computations. We use the
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current gas price of 1 Gwei/gas,23 and the average ether
price over November 2017 of 346 USD/ether to calculate
the dollar price of participating in the mix. Our perfor-
mance benchmarks were collected on a laptop with an
Intel Core i7 2.5GHz CPU and 8 GB of RAM.
6.1 Implementation details
The mixing contract consists of roughly 350 lines
of Solidity code, a high-level language targeting the
Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). Solidity is compiled
to EVM byte code, which is then broadcast to the net-
work and replicated in every node’s storage. The func-
tions VerifyDeposit, ProcessDeposit, VerifyWithdraw, and
ProcessWithdraw consume gas (as they are performed
on-chain), but the others are off-chain and thus free.
The code for both the sender and the recipient con-
sists of roughly 400 lines of Go code, and allows them
to (respectively) generate ECDSA stealth addresses and
Franklin-Zhang (FZ) ring signatures [13].
Using the native support for elliptic curve cryptog-
raphy and big number arithmetic on the EVM, we im-
plemented in Solidity the functions required for the con-
tract to run VerifyDeposit and VerifyWithdraw. Briefly,
ecmul computes the product of an elliptic curve point
and a 256-bit scalar over bn256; ecadd computes the
sum of two elliptic curve points; expmod computes ex-
ponentials of the form be mod m, where m is an integer
of up to 256 bits; and get_y computes the y-coordinate
associated with a given x-coordinate. The gas costs for
these functions are shown in Table 1.
In our current implementation, the sender provides
the full stealth public key, which the contract then stores
in pubkeys[]. This is because the current gas costs in
Ethereum make it cheaper to store the entire key, as op-
posed to having the sender send only the x-coordinate
of spkB and then have the contract recompute the cor-
responding y-coordinate when needed.
The version of Möbius presented in Section 4 re-
quired the contract to store ring signatures in sigs[],
and verify against these when verifying additional signa-
tures. Using FZ signatures, we can significantly reduce
this cost: as briefly discussed in Section 2.4, FZ signa-
tures consist of both a zero-knowledge proof of mem-
bership and a linking tag, which for the i-th party is
2 1 GWei is 1×10−9 ether, with Wei being the smallest denom-
ination of ether.
3 https://ethgasstation.info/
formed as H(R)xi (where R is the ring and xi is the
secret key). To perform the linking necessary to check
for double withdrawals, the contract therefore need only
store the tags, rather than the full signatures.
Finally, for ease of development our current imple-
mentation stores all contract values in Ethereum. To
further reduce storage costs, however, we could store
only a reference hash in the contract storage and then
store the data itself in IPFS,4 which is much cheaper in
terms of storage.
6.2 Costs
We now consider the costs, in terms of computation,
storage, and gas, of each of the operations in our sys-
tem. These are summarized in Tables 1 and 2. In terms
of latency, this is dependent on the number of partici-
pants in the contract (which also determines the size of
the anonymity set, and the cost of a withdrawal trans-
action), so we leave this as a parameter n and highlight
particular choices of n where appropriate.
An Ethereum transaction consists of the following
fields: a nonce, which for our purposes is always 1 byte;
gasPrice and amt in Wei, represented by their hex encod-
ing; gasLimit, which is also hex encoded; the to address,
which is 20 bytes; data, with 32 bytes per argument; and
the ECDSA signature over the hash of all the above,
which is 65 bytes. (One can recover the sender’s public
key from the signature, which is why it is not given ex-
plicitly.) In function calls, the function signature, which
is formed by taking the first 4 bytes of the hash of the
function name and parameters, is prepended to data.
This means that the base size of an Ethereum transac-
tion sending 1 ether to a function is 120 bytes.
The stealth public key that the sender must include
in their deposit transaction is 64 bytes, so a deposit
transaction is 184 bytes. On the recipient side, we do
not need to include the ring description (as it is the
pubkeys[] field of the contract), but must include the
intended recipient address (or its corresponding public
key), which also functions as the message being signed.
The ring signature is only 64(n + 1) bytes, where n is
the size of the ring, and the message is an additional 64
bytes, as the data field pads all values to 32 bytes. This
means the withdraw transaction is 120 + 64(n + 2) =
248 + 64n bytes (and, for example, we need to get to
n = 12 before the transaction size exceeds 1 kB.)
4 https://ipfs.io/
Brought to you by | UCL - University College London
Authenticated
Download Date | 4/13/18 5:39 PM
Möbius: Trustless Tumbling for Transaction Privacy 116





deposit i = 1 105,346 0.036
i > 1 76,123 0.026
withdraw 335,714n 0.116n
Table 1. The costs, in both gas and USD, for our elliptic curve
functions, and for the two functions needed to process transac-
tions. For deposit, i denotes the number of the sender paying in
(i.e., if they are the first sender or not). n denotes the number
of participants in the mix. A constant 38,403 gas (0.013 USD) is
added to all withdraw transactions. The values in USD are com-
puted using the November 2017 costs of 1 GWei/gas and 346
USD/ether.
The contract then needs to store pubkeys[], which
means storing 64n bytes. It also needs to store
sendaddr[], which means storing 20n bytes. Finally, stor-
ing sigs[] means storing (at most) 64n bytes, given the
optimization of storing only tags we discussed above. In
total then, the contract must store up to 148n bytes.
At the current cost of 20,000 gas per 32 bytes of stor-
age, this requires 100,000n gas, the cost of which is dis-
tributed between the senders and recipients. (Again, to
provide concrete numbers, this means we need to get to
n = 28 before the storage cost exceeds 1 USD.)
In Ethereum, the cost to deploy a contract is a fixed
32,000 gas, plus an amount determined by the length
and complexity of the contract [36]. The initial cost of
deploying the Möbius mixing contract is 1,046,027 gas
(0.36 USD). The contract needs to be deployed only
once, by anyone who wants to do so, and can then be
reused arbitrarily many times.
Table 1 shows the gas costs of the main functions
in the elliptic curve arithmetic library, and the two
functions used in the ring mixing contract that forms
Möbius. For deposit, it currently uses more gas (105,346)
to process the transaction of the first sender paying in,
as it costs extra gas to set storage in the EVM, but af-
ter the first sender the costs are the same (76,123). For
withdraw, the costs reflect the ring signature verification
and thus are dependent on the number of participants
n. In terms of comparing these costs, the current sug-
gested fee for an average Bitcoin transactions is 38,420
satoshis.5 As of November 2017, with Bitcoin worth
11,379 USD (or as of the current writing much more),
5 https://bitcoinfees.earn.com/
Function Time taken (ms)
deposit 0.098
withdraw 3.254
Table 2. Time taken, in milliseconds, to generate the transactions
needed in Möbius, for n = 4. The time for deposit is averaged
over 3,000 runs, and the time for withdraw over 5,000 runs.
this is 4.37 USD, so we can see all our operations are
substantially cheaper. While all values in USD should be
taken with a grain of salt, due to the volatility of both
Bitcoin and Ethereum, this means that even if we use
n = 350 then Möbius is roughly the same price as one
of the most efficient existing tumblers, TumbleBit [16],
and while the latency may be higher, the overall coor-
dination and computational costs are still much lower.
In terms of off-chain computations for the parties,
Table 2 gives the computation time for the sender to run
Deposit and for the recipient to run Withdraw. Again, we
see that the costs are very minimal.
7 Related Work
We consider as related work any solution that is
attempting to improve anonymity in cryptocurren-
cies beyond what is provided by the basic usage of
pseudonyms, either in terms of mixing services, so-
called “privacy overlays,” or standalone cryptocurren-
cies. Möbius achieves different anonymity but stronger
overall security guarantees relative to related work, and
is overall more efficient.
7.1 Tumblers and mixing solutions
Table 3 presents a comparison of the security properties
of previously proposed tumblers [6, 7, 16, 21, 32, 34],
both centralized and decentralized, and Table 4 presents
an efficiency comparison.
Looking at Table 3, we can see that Möbius essen-
tially achieves the opposite anonymity guarantees to all
other schemes. In particular, while all schemes achieve
anonymity against passive eavesdroppers, all of them ex-
cept TumbleBit require the recipient to send the sender
their address in the clear—as is done in a standard
Bitcoin payment— in order to initiate the transfer, ren-
dering anonymity with respect to malicious senders im-
possible.
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Anonymity against... Availability Theft prevention
outsiders senders recipients sender tumbler
Centralized
Mixcoin [7] TTP* 7 X X 7 TTP
Blindcoin [34] X 7 X X 7 TTP
TumbleBit [16] X X X X 7 X
Decentralized
Coinjoin [21] X 7 X 7 n.a. X
Coinshuﬄe [32] X 7 X 7 n.a. X
XIM [6] X 7 X X n.a. X
Möbius X X 7 X X X
Table 3. The security properties achieved by each system discussed in this section. For anonymity, we consider security against the
three adversaries mentioned in Section 3: an outside eavesdropper, a sender, and a recipient. For availability, we consider the ability of
other participants to cause a sender to waste their effort in a transaction that does not go through, and also consider the ability of a
tumbler itself to prevent mixing (which is not applicable in decentralized systems). TTP denotes a trusted third party.
* In Mixcoin the third party learns the mapping, but under the assumption they do not reveal it, the system achieves anonymity
against an outside observer.
# Off-chain messages # Transactions
Centralized
Mixcoin [7] 2 2
Blindcoin [34] 4 2
TumbleBit [16] 12 4
Decentralized
Coinjoin [21] O(n2) 1
Coinshuﬄe [32] O(n) 1
XIM [6] 0 7*
Möbius 2** 2
Table 4. The communication complexity, in terms of off-chain
messages and on-chain transactions, required for each system.
For the centralized ones we capture the cost for a single sender-
recipient pair (because they can mix through the tumbler), while
for the decentralized ones we capture the cost for n participants
to mix (as they can mix only with each other).
* XIM works between two participants, and so cannot be fully
compared with the other decentralized mixes, in which n parties
can participate.
** In our system, Möbius, the exchange (consisting of two mes-
sages) is needed only once per pair, not per transaction, so the
cost can be amortized across many transactions.
Beyond anonymity, we also see that Möbius achieves
different availability guarantees from previous systems.
In centralized systems, the tumbler could go down ei-
ther before the transfer takes place, or—worse—the
tumbler could go down during the transfer (after Al-
ice has sent coins to the tumbler but before it has sent
them to Bob), in which case the coins are lost. In these
systems, tumblers are therefore very much relied upon
for availability. On the other hand, they can achieve low
latency, as participants do not need to rely on others to
mix.
Current decentralized systems, in contrast, have
higher latency due to the coordination costs needed
to set up the mix. They also enable malicious senders
to waste the resources of other senders, by pretending
to engage in the transaction and going oﬄine only at
the last minute. XIM [6] minimizes this risk by requir-
ing participants to pay a fee upfront, but—as we see
in Table 4—this comes at the cost of a high number
of transactions and thus high latency. Möbius inherits
some of the latency issues of decentralized solutions, but
requires no coordination amongst senders and achieves
a high level of availability. It also mitigates the risk of
senders wasting each other’s time because senders com-
mit to participating in the mix and release their funds
in the same atomic transaction.
In Table 4, we can see that Möbius uses signifi-
cantly fewer combined messages and transactions than
any previous system, as even for Mixcoin there are still
2 off-chain messages required per transfer (rather than
our amortized cost). We also see a clear trade-off be-
tween centralized systems, which typically require more
rounds of interaction throughout but achieve constant
communication complexity (as all parties can commu-
nicate directly with the tumbler), and decentralized
systems, in which parties need to coordinate amongst
themselves. The exception is XIM, which has the ex-
plicit goal of avoiding all off-chain communication, but
comes at the cost of requiring a high number of on-chain
transactions [6].
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7.2 Standalone cryptocurrencies
While we cannot compare directly against standalone
cryptocurrencies, as they operate in a different model
(e.g., there is no notion of theft prevention) and are not
designed as modular solutions, we nevertheless compare
anonymity and efficiency properties.
In Monero [35], senders select several other unspent
transaction outputs, all of which must hold the same
value, and forms a ring signature over them to achieve
anonymity for the sender. This type of passive partic-
ipation also provides users with plausible deniability.
Monero does not, however, achieve anonymity for recip-
ients, as just like for decentralized mixes senders need
to know their address in order to create the transac-
tion; again, this seems inherent in any solution with
a single transaction. Furthermore, in terms of security,
coin forgery holds only computationally in Monero, an
attack on its anonymity was possible until recently [26],
and it is still subject to timing-related attacks. In terms
of efficiency, due to the growing size of the set of unspent
transaction outputs, Monero addresses are 69 bytes (in
contrast to Ethereum’s 20-byte addresses), and the av-
erage transaction size is 13 kB, which is larger than a
Möbius transaction with 160 participants.
Zcash6 is based on the notion of succinct zero-
knowledge proofs (zk-SNARKs for short), which were
first proposed for use on the blockchain in 2013 [3, 25]
and allow users to prove that a given transaction is
valid without revealing any specific information about
it (e.g., the sender and recipient, or the value being
sent) [18]. In terms of security, Zcash achieves essen-
tially the strongest notion of anonymity possible, as
the anonymity set is all other Zcash users who engage
in shielded transactions (so-called transparent transac-
tions, in which no anonymity is achieved, are also pos-
sible in Zcash). Despite recent advances [4, 5], however,
Zcash requires a trusted setup, without which a mali-
cious party could forge an arbitrary number of coins. In
terms of efficiency, transaction generation is currently
extremely expensive, taking an average of 48 seconds to
generate and using 4 GB of RAM.7
Finally, while not a full standalone cryptocurrency,
Möbius is also related to Zerocoin [3], and in particu-
lar to the simplified version of Zerocoin presented by
Groth and Kohlweiss [14], which is made possible by
their sublinear ring signature. In this setting, (non-
6 https://z.cash
7 https://speed.z.cash
linkable) ring signatures are accompanied by a serial
number, known to both the sender and recipient, which
achieves a weaker notion of anonymity than Möbius
(as the sender and recipient can link themselves to the
other). While this could be modified (as discussed in
Section 2.4) to achieve the same level of anonymity by
providing instead a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
of the serial number, this would be at the cost of effi-
ciency.
8 Extensions and Improvements
8.1 Minimizing communication
The off-chain communication costs in Möbius are al-
ready fairly minimal, with the sender and recipient
needing to agree on just the shared secret in Initialize.
As the channel over which they communicate this secret
does not need to be secure, in theory the communication
could be moved on-chain, with the sender and recipient
broadcasting their respective mpkA and mpkB and con-
structing secret using ECDH. There are also options for
eliminating the interaction in Initialize entirely, such as
adding an on-chain mpk directory.
The notification step could also be eliminated, as
previously discussed, by having a directory, or registry,
of mixing contracts. Identifying whether or not sufficient
parties have joined the contract is available in our imple-
mentation through a function checkn, which returns the
number of participants currently in the ring for a given
mixing contract, and the desired threshold is available
as part of the contract state. This function consumes no
gas, as it is simply a query, but requires the intended
recipient to know idcontract.
8.2 Sending arbitrary denominations
In the existence of a contract registry, or even without
one, one could also allow a sender Alice to be able to
send any denomination of funds to a recipient Bob (al-
beit at a relatively high cost). This would be achieved
by, for example, deploying and registering a contract
for every power of two, and then having Alice perform
a base-two decomposition of her desired denomination
and send the appropriate amount to the appropriate
contract, using a different stealth address for Bob each
time.
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Depending on the value of ether, this process could
of course be prohibitively expensive in terms of both
transaction fees and gas costs. It therefore would also
be useful to have additional contracts for common de-
nominations, or to investigate other decompositions.
8.3 Auditability
In addition to reducing the off-chain communication
overhead, the deterministic nature of stealth keys also
makes it possible for a third party to audit the system,
as long as senders and recipients share their auxiliary
information with such a party (thus allowing them to
derive stealth keys and observe their use within previous
contracts). This means that Möbius may be useful not
only on the public Ethereum platform, but also in per-
missioned blockchain settings. For example, if transfers
are permitted only to known recipients with known (or
‘whitelisted’) master public keys, then when recipients
withdraw they can also include a ring signature over the
list of authorized master public keys, thus proving that
they are a known recipient. This allows participants to
operate in a controlled environment but still retain fi-
nancial privacy.
8.4 Increasing anonymity
In Möbius, the size of the anonymity set depends on the
number of participants in a given contract. Given the
tradeoff between the size of this set and the efficiency
of the mix (both in terms of the latency required for
each participant, as they wait for other senders to join,
and in terms of the cost of using linear ring signatures),
senders may not get the level of anonymity they want
in a single iteration of Möbius.
If the level of anonymity gained through use of one
tumbler is not sufficient, users can chain tumblers to
build a mix network similar to those in Mixcoin [7]
and Blindcoin [34]. Thus, rather than having the recip-
ient spend the funds they receive in a normal transac-
tion, they are instead fed directly into another session
of Möbius. This further obfuscates the flow of money,
and the size of the anonymity set grows as a sum of the
anonymity sets in each session.
8.5 EVM compatibility
Currently, Ethereum allows calls only from addresses
that already hold ether, so can pay for gas with the ac-
count balance. Giving contracts the ability to pay for
gas used in the execution of contract calls is a planned
change in Ethereum, but Möbius as presented is cur-
rently incompatible with Ethereum, as our specifica-
tion of Withdraw requires contract calls to be sent from
freshly generated addresses (with zero balance).
One way to work around this issue in the mean-
time is to outsource the FormTx aspect of Withdraw to
accounts that do hold ether. In this case, the intended
recipients would still generate an ephemeral keypair and
form the ring signature including as a message the ad-
dress they intend the ether to be withdrawn to. The re-
cipient would then send the ring signature and address
to the party responsible for running FormTx, rather than
executing this themselves. Due to the ring signature be-
ing formed over the ephemeral address, we ensure that
the party to whom the withdrawal transaction is out-
sourced has no ability to withdraw the funds to their
own account, and thus does not need to be trusted. To
incentivize this party or service, the recipient can also
pay them a fee when the funds are released.
9 Conclusions
We have proposed Möbius, a low-cost mixing sys-
tem based on smart contracts that provides partici-
pants with not only strong notions of privacy, but also
strong availability due to the resilience of the Ethereum
blockchain. Due to the functionality of smart contracts,
no coordination is required between parties wishing to
transact in the same mix, no trust is required in off-chain
servers, and no parties (even when all but one collude)
have the ability to stop any honest party’s funds from
being withdrawn by the intended recipient. Even be-
tween parties wishing to transfer funds to each other,
the communication cost is minimal and we have dis-
cussed—among other possible extensions to the sys-
tem—ways to eliminate this overhead entirely. Given
its practicality, and the modifications we describe to
make it compatible with the EVM, we believe that
Möbius could be deployed today.
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